The question is whether it is 3000
ends with the prosecution
is fascinating, but that is not the most important thing in this respect. Undoubtedly, the question of all abuses is rightly whether it has crossed the line and considered a crime. Of course, this is the bread and butter of police investigators and prosecutors. However, the issues raised by the submarine are equally important, equally important: a method of far-reaching safety concerns.
At least six questions are at hand. The first question concerns the Germans' awareness that Israel was interested in acquiring three other submarines, nine in total, but that the decision was amended only after Defense Secretary Moshe Ya'Alon opposed the decision that three other submarines would replace three old submarines.
Nine submarines are far ahead of the need and ability to maintain. So how did that kind of purpose arise?
The second is why should such a decision be taken at an early stage that the existing submarines are outdated? How the cabinet approves the military's multi-year plan, the Gideon program, and soon after deciding on such a decision within this plan.
The third question concerns the Defense Minister's argument that the Prime Minister, without his knowledge, asked Germany to buy two vessels with submarine detection features. This is similar to the Prime Minister's request to buy another F-15 fleet to the United States without the Defense Minister, the Head of Staff and the Air Force Commander.
With regard to all these three issues, it should be stressed that the multiannual plan of the defense is to maximize the security of a given budget. It is possible and necessary to speak of an optimal balance, but it is not sensible to make random decisions without realizing the complete alternative price and it is impossible to decide and it is not really to convey it to another country until it deepens the internal debate among Israeli decision-makers.
The fourth issue is more worrying: the cancellation of a tender for the purchase of a vessel to protect the Israeli naval EEZ and the unilateral decision to acquire these vessels from Thyssenkrup, which is not an obvious advantage in this area, contrary to submarines.
It turns out that eventually large (and more expensive) vessels were purchased more than originally required. It is true that there are situations where it is better not to make a bid and to trade between two countries (for example, a GTG transaction), but in such cases another state also commits to acquire similar values from Israel. This has not happened here, and it is obvious that unusual pressure was applied, which led to a confusing decision.
The fifth question concerns the unusual request of the German Histadrut Workers' Association to privatize fleet yards. Given that the shipyard is the property of IDF, it is very unusual to say that real estate negotiations are arranged behind the landlord. Who was aware and who cooperated with this?
The sixth question and the most worrying argument is that an Israeli official told German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Israel has not opposed Germany, who sells advanced submarines to Egypt without the Defense Minister's knowledge.
In fact, there can be no criminal justice aspect of these matters, but if these things are only examined through the criminal process? Does the police have the knowledge, experience and motivation to investigate this?
These are issues that relate to two completely different sectors: foreign policy and security, and the work of the Israeli Government, including the responsibilities of the various parties.
Underestimating the severity of criminals' suspicions, it seems that the more important are the 3000 cases dealing with the military strategic procurement process and making decisions less interest.